Preface: Breaking the Existing Pattern of Rights and Privileges to Accelerate the Process of
In China, the process of allowing more rural migrants into urban areas to become registered city residents (citizenization) remains stagnant despite its importance to the Chinese government and the existence of a national consensus about it. Why is that? Is experience available from other countries? How do we solve this problem? Perhaps through institutional inertia, vested interests are hindering the process of citizenization in China. Derived from China’s hukou system, or household registration system, that unfairly favors urban residents over rural ones, the inequitable distribution of benefits between institutionally favored groups and others, and between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies, for example, has resulted in advantaged groups and vested interests obviously wanting to maintain and cement this pattern while the disadvantaged groups and those whose interests are damaged are unable to change it. In China, cities can compulsorily purchase land from farmers at low or even no costs, but most profits from added land value are usually unavailable to farmers who rely on land for a living, generation after generation. Assuming annual profits of one trillion yuan1 from land trades and transfers across China, then China’s cities can absorb a total of 10 million rural migrants at the cost of 100,000 yuan per migrant or 20 million at the cost of 50,000 per migrant. Unfortunately, children of migrant workers in China are deprived of the right to compulsory education despite the fact that these workers pay taxes in their host cities and their employers pay the so-called “city construction fees” and “educational surcharge”. Payments to migrant workers should be able to cover basic expenses of the family. In particular, they should cover not only the costs of necessities and the living support for dependents such as the elderly and the disabled, but also the cost of raising children. In some cities, however, the rights and interests of migrant workers are overlooked. Local governments may go so far as to conspire with relevant companies to underpay and/or postpone payment to these workers. Even some state-owned organizations offer unequal 1
Wu Jinglian noted at the China Development Forum held on March 23–25, 2013 that the Chinese government had earned 30 trillion yuan from expropriating farmland for urbanization, http:// finance.qq.com/a/20130323/001590.htm v
Preface: Breaking the Existing Pattern of Rights and Privileges to Accelerate…
opportunities and payments to employees depending on whether they subscribe to the aforementioned unfair institutional arrangements or not. Decision makers in certain Chinese cities seem to believe in the theory of cost while ignoring that of rights or benefits in an apparent attempt to favor vested interests. There are also think tank members who, despite their supposedly interest-neutral nature, employ biased methods and draw prejudiced conclusions. Nonetheless, such incomplete urbanization, which can be compared to catching fish by means of draining the pond entirely, is doomed to be unsustainable and is certainly unlikely to make the Chinese Dream come true. The provision of equal opportunities and basic support in the process of urbanization in developed countries deserves closer study. Take Chinese people who have gone to study in the United States for example. After graduation, except for a minority who stay in the academic or research sectors, they tend to work in private companies or start their own business. It seems clear that there are few difficulties caused by the institutional bias evoked above.2 In Japan, the urbanization rate was only 27.8 % in 1945 but increased rapidly to 72.1 % 25 years later, a rate nearly twice that of China. To provide workers with housing, Japan spent public funds building public hostels. It was in the early 1960s that Japan launched a program to decentralize human, financial and physical resources from big cities to smaller towns, thereby facilitating the employment and citizenization of Japanese people in their respective places of residence.3 In the period between independence and the early 1980s, Singapore, as one of the four Asian Dragons, became industrialized and urbanized rapidly. The Housing Development Board (HDB) provided 80 % of Singaporeans with apartments within only some 20 years. In the 1990s, there were nearly 90 % of Singaporeans living in buildings provided by the HDB. In the twenty-first century, the HDB has launched the Studio Apartments (SAs) program for the aging population. One-bedroom SAs are 35 or 45 m2 in size and sold on 30-year leases at SGD 47,800–71,700.4 With a small territory and high population density, and by adopting a combination of state monopoly and privatization policies, Singapore has managed to achieve near-universal coverage of housing assistance while at the same time securing a fuel for national development in the long term.5 Breaking down the existing distributive pattern of rights and privileges requires legislation and law enforcement. We are unable to maximize national and social interests if our cities are at the same time aiming to maximize their own interests while ignoring those of rural migrant workers. It is similarly impossible to assure
The Heilongjiang Morning Post reported on January 5, 2013 that the city of Harbin publicly recruited cleaners from around China and that 7 of the 29 candidates who had master’s or doctoral degrees had got the job. 3 Lan Jianzhong: “How did Japan turn farmers into registered city residents”, Reference News, April 24, 2013, p. 11. 4 Lawrence Chin, 2004. Public Housing Governance in Singapore: Current Issues and Challenges, Department of Real Estate, National University of Singapore. 5 Wong Tai-chee and Guillot Xavier, 2004. A Roof over Every Head: Singapore’s Housing Policy between State Monopoly and Privatization. IRASEC-Sampark, p. 256.
Preface: Breaking the Existing Pattern of Rights and Privileges to Accelerate…
the financial and social interests of 260 million rural migrant workers only through the efforts of the 31 migrant workers who are delegates to the National People’s Congress (NPC).6 Before reform and opening up began, the distributive pattern of benefits in the Chinese society was relatively simple, which was one of urban–rural dichotomy. After that, the distributive pattern, while remaining in essence dualistic, i.e., pitting urban against rural areas, features a larger number of and finer-grained categories, including those with either urban or rural hukou, and those with either urban or rural hukou that live in metropolitan areas, as well as those who lack of hukou registered in cities (or towns). To break through the existing distributive pattern of rights and privileges, we must first legally clarify and confirm the social costs and benefits of citizenization so as to let everyone who contributes to China’s industrialization and urbanization, whether he/she is an old or new citizen, or a rural migrant not yet registered on the local hukou system, benefit from its reform and development. We should know what the costs and benefits are. Second, we should make laws to decentralize social and economic resources and make them market-oriented. The reasons why Tier 1 cities and provincial capitals are suffering serious urban problems, such as being overburdened with a great number of rural migrants, primarily include the monopoly of economic and social resources caused by the centralization of administrative powers. In China, almost all the best education, medical, cultural, sports and other resources are centralized in Tier 1 cities and provincial capitals. In contrast there is a shortage of job opportunities in Tier 3 and 4 cities, where people often find it difficult to make a living. Third, and most important, is law enforcement instead of selective law enforcement. We should say that China already has a rather complete legal system consisting of the labor law, the compulsory education law, the social security law and so on. Nonetheless, some cities and decision makers opt for selective law enforcement or the circumvention of particular laws, making it impossible to effectively enforce laws. The average salary income at a monopolistic SOE should never be much higher than the average national income if it is all-peopleowned; proceeds from the sale of reserved land for urban development, if it is stateowned, can add much to the fund for building houses that ensure the citizenization of rural migrants. The constitution grants people the right to vote and be voted for, which should not be denied where rural migrants work and live. With institutional arrangements that lead to an urban–rural dual structure, Chinese cities have been receiving direct and indirect benefits from rural migrants since the country began the process of reform and opening up. But at the same time they have overlooked, or even refused, to give citizenization-relevant benefits to such migrants. This has greatly hindered the process of citizenization while continuously increasing the already high social, economic and environmental costs. Workers recruited from rural areas before China began the process of reform and opening up, 6
In China, the number of migrant-worker delegates to the NPC increased to 31 for the 12th NPC from three 5 years ago; they represent 260 million migrant workers. Yao Xueqing: “Thirty-one migrant-worker delegates to the NPC: they speak for 260 million migrant workers”, People’s Daily, March 12, 2013.
Preface: Breaking the Existing Pattern of Rights and Privileges to Accelerate…
as well as university graduates in the 1980s and the 1990s, typically lived in less comfortable dormitories and received low wages/salaries. Nonetheless, they had access to basic security and rights. With regard to the citizenization of rural migrants, they do not need benefits available to the white-collar elite, nor do they expect to live in luxurious houses. While contributing their labor and wisdom to the host cities, they need basic housing, education, medical care, political rights, labor benefits and equal opportunities. Since the citizenization of rural migrants clearly makes sense from the social, economic and legal perspectives, it should and can be implemented. To this end, we need only to break through the existing pattern of interests and respect the citizenization-relevant rights of rural migrant workers. Beijing, China
Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers ..................................................................... Jiahua Pan
Evaluating China’s Cities for Scientifically-Sound Development ............................................................................................ Jingjing Shan, Zhanyun Wu, and Ya’nan Geng
The Evolution of China’s Migrant Worker Policies for Since 1978 .......................................................................................... Shunjiang Huang
The Status of Migrants in Cities and Innovations in Social Management............................................................................. 101 Min Du
Cost Estimation and Cost Sharing Mechanism for Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers....................................... 129 Jingjing Shan
Methods for the Citizenization of Migrant Workers in Megacities ............................................................................................ 149 Yanting Ni and Yingchang Song
Approach to and Suggestions for Further Reform of the Hukou System ............................................................................... 163 Liejun Wang
Encouraging Farmers to Migrate with Asset ....................................... 195 Xueyuan Chen
Establishing a Unified Urban-Rural Fair Employment System ............................................................................... 215 Meng Li and Qimin Peng
Promoting Universal Coverage of Basic Public Services Among Urban Residents .......................................................... 237 Ning Wang and Yeqiang Wang
Improving the Social Security System for Migrant Workers.............. 255 Hongyu Li and Shangpeng Liang
Strengthening Housing Security for Migrant Workers ....................... 275 Xin Dong
Editors and Contributors
Xueyuan Chen is in a post-doctoral program at the IUE and focuses his research on integrated urban and rural development, reforming of the rural property rights system, and rural collective economy. Xin Dong is a Ph.D. in Economics and associate researcher at the IUE who focuses on real estate economics. Min Du holds a Ph.D. in management and is an associate researcher at China Population and Development Research Center (CPDRC) who focuses on demographic economics. Ya’nan Geng is a candidate for a master’s degree at the Department of Urban Development and Environment, the Graduate School of the CASS, who focuses on urban and regional management. Shunjiang Huang is an associate researcher at the IUE who focuses on researching urbanization. Hongyu Li is Director, the Urban Planning Research Office, the IUE, and Chairperson, the Urban Policy and Culture Research Center, who focuses on urban planning and sustainability. Meng Li is an associate researcher at the IUE whose research focuses on urban/ environmental economics and sustainable development. Shangpeng Liang is a postgraduate student at the IUE who focuses on urban economics and researches urban and regional development. Yanting Ni is a doctoral candidate at the IUE who focuses on urban and regional management.
Editors and Contributors
Jiahua Pan is Director of Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies (IUES), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and Professor of Economics at CASS Graduate School, Editor-in-Chief of the Chinese Journal of Urban and Environmental Studies. Received his Ph.D. from Cambridge University in 1992. Areas of study include: economics of sustainable development, energy and climate policy, world economy and environmental and natural resource economics. Worked for the UNDP Beijing Office as an advisor on environment and development; Lead author of the IPCC Working Group III 3rd, 4th and 5th Assessment Report on Mitigation; Member of China National Expert Panel on Climate Change; Member of National Foreign Policy Advisory Group; Advisor to the Ministry of Environment Protection. Vice president of Chinese Association for Urban Economy, vice president of the Chinese Society of Ecological Economists, vice president of Chinese Energy Association. Co-editor of Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, published by Cambridge University Press, and author or co-author of over 300 papers, articles and books in both English (including Science, Nature, Oxford Review of Economic Policy) and Chinese (including Journal of Economic Research and China Social Sciences). Winner of First and Second prize for best research work, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (2002, 2004 and 2013). Winner of Sun Yefang Prize in Economic Science, 2011. Named China Green Person of the Year 2010/2011. Qimin Peng is an associate researcher at the National Key Laboratory of Integrated Information System Technology, the Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, who focuses on social computing, integrated information processing and smart city. Jingjing Shan is researcher of IUES, CASS. Main areas of research include: urban and regional planning and development strategies. Led or participated in the drafting of both general and topical economic and social development plans for more than 20 cities or areas. Head of research team for 28 research projects, including 19 commissioned by provincial governments. Some of these projects have been funded by the National Social Sciences Fund of China, CASS, and the Foundation for Young Scholars; Authored, co-authored or edited 17 books; Published over 50 papers in both English and Chinese, and wrote over 50 research reports; Author or co-author of more than 10 policy proposals submitted to the State Council. Yingchang Song is deputy director-general and researcher of IUES, CASS; Director-general of the Office of Urban and Regional Management; Professor and doctoral advisor in Urban and Environmental Studies Department, CASS Graduate School; Executive director of China Society of Urban Economy; Member of the Academic Committee of Regional Planning and Urban Economy of UPSC; Member of the expert committee of the Association for Promoting Administrative Districting and Regional Development in China; Member of Academic Advisory Board, Beijing Municipal Natural Science Foundation; Head of research team for six key or major research projects supported by the National Social Sciences Fund of China and CASS, and 20 local government-commissioned projects; Author of 4 monographs, and over 50 articles and chapters in core academic journals such as Journal
Editors and Contributors
of Geographical Sciences, Geography Research, Urban Planning, Urban Development Studies, Economic Geography, Urban Planning Forum, and Journal of Population Studies. Liejun Wang is an associate researcher and Director of the Research Office, the Social Development Research Department, the DRC. Ning Wang is a candidate for a doctoral degree at the Department of Urban Development and Environment, the Graduate School of the CASS, who focuses on public services. Yeqiang Wang is associate research fellow at IUES, CASS, and deputy secretarygeneral of the Research Center for Western China, CASS. Received M.Sc. from Nanjing University and Ph.D. in Economics from CASS Graduate School; Postdoctoral researcher at Institute of Fiscal Science, Ministry of Finance; Author or co-author of over 10 papers published in core national academic journals, including Management World, China Industrial Economics, Statistical Research, Economic Geography, Finance and Trade Economics, and 2 of them were reprinted by Renmin University of China’s Information Center for Social Sciences. The paper first published in China Economic Journal was indexed in the Taylor & Francis database, and reprinted in Revista de Economie Industriala, a Romanian journal. Authored, co-authored or edited 6 books; Participated in many research projects supported by National Social Sciences Fund of China and National Natural Science Foundation of China, and the drafting of many local economic and social development plans. Houkai Wei is deputy director of IUES, CASS and director-general, professor and doctoral advisor in Urban and Environmental Studies Department, CASS Graduate School; Recipient of the State Council Special Governance Allowance; Elected director-general of the Research Center for Western China, CASS; Deputy secretarygeneral of the Regional Science Association of China and China Society of Regional Economic Development; Elected deputy director-general of the Academic Committee on Regional Planning and Urban Economy of the Urban Planning Society of China (UPSC), and the Natural Resources Economy and Planning Committee of the Chinese Society of Economics of Geology and Mineral Resources; Assistant professor at Peking University, Shandong University, Sichuan University, Minzu University of China, Hunan University, Hunan Normal University, Henan University, Northwest University; Head of research team for over 60 key CASS and government-commissioned projects; Author or chief editor of over 20 books, over 300 papers in both English and Chinese language journals such as Social Sciences in China and Economic Research Journal. More than 50 of these were reprinted in Xinhua Digest and the Renmin University of China’s Information Center for Social Sciences; Winner of over 20 national or provincial-level awards for outstanding research; Author or co-author of over 20 policy proposals submitted to the State Council. Zhanyun Wu is a postdoctoral researcher at the IUE, who focuses on urbanization and urban/regional planning.
Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers Jiahua Pan
As China has rapidly industrialized since it began the process of reform and opening up, a great many farmers have shifted out of agriculture and are now working or studying and living in towns or cities, leading to a fast increase in China’s Urbanization rate. However, given that reform of the hukou system has stagnated, as well as the fact that social security and public service systems prioritize urban areas over rural ones, rural migrant workers are not treated in the same way as native urban residents in terms of employment and welfare, despite being counted as part of the urban population. This has led to a low citizenization rate. As a result, a new dual structure consisting of rural migrant workers and native urban residents has come into being in Chinese cities at a time when the long-standing urban-rural dual structure has yet to be eliminated. This has severely hindered the building of a harmonious society and the urbanization of China. To remove such a dual structure as soon as possible, the Communist Party of China (CPC) made it clear in the report to the 18th CPC Congress that it would accelerate reform of the hukou system, systematically promote the citizenization of rural migrant workers, and endeavor to cover the entire permanent urban population with basic public services. Later on, the CPC announced at the Central Economic Work Conference that it would prioritize the systematic promotion of the citizenization of rural migrant workers. In this new situation, a key challenge in promoting and improving urbanization in China will be how to systematically promote the citizenization of rural migrant workers by adopting effective policies and measures.
itizenization of Rural Migrant Workers: Definition C and Meaning The term “the citizenization of rural migrant workers” first appeared in the report to the 18th CPC Congress held in late 2012. It is consistent with “steadily promot[ing] the turning of rural migrant workers into urban residents” mentioned in the 12th Five-Year Plan. In order to gain a clear understanding of the citizenization of rural migrant workers, we should first make clear the meaning of rural migrant workers. In a broad sense, rural migrant workers include people who have moved to towns or cities from the countryside and people who have shifted to non-agricultural sectors from agriculture. These two groups are closely tied to each other, on the one hand, and differ from each other, on the other. But both of them mainly comprise people who have moved to urban areas to work or do business there. In addition to these people, the first group includes their family members, suburban farmers who have lost their land1 and rural people who have moved to towns or cities for education, marriage or other reasons; the second group includes people who have otherwise moved to towns or cities to work there and who work in non-agricultural sectors in the countryside. In a narrow sense, rural migrant workers mainly refer to people with rural hukou who work at local township and village enterprises (TVEs) or who have moved to towns or cities to work in non-agricultural sectors. It is intended to replace the concept of “migrant workers”. Although the CPC Central Committee has proposed the citizenization of rural migrant workers, the focus of many scholars, such as Jin Sanlin (2013), Jin Zhongxia and Xiong Lu (2013), and Zhang Guiwen (2013), is still non-local migrant workers in the cities. The citizenization of these workers is more difficult than that of farmers who have lost their land and local migrant workers. Since non-local migrant workers constitute the vast majority of rural migrant workers, we have focused our study on this group. While the definition of the citizenization of rural migrant workers varies from scholar to scholar, the differences aren’t significant. It is believed by some that the citizenization of rural migrant workers refers to a situation whereby, after making occupational changes, rural migrant workers secure social status and rights equivalent to those of residents with urban hukou and gain equal access to public resources and social welfare in the host towns or cities. It would also mean that they get fully involved in political, economic, social and cultural activities, thereby achieving financial security, social acceptance, identity and cultural integration (Jin Sanlin 2013). It is believed by others that the citizenization of rural migrant workers refers to the process where rural migrant workers find jobs in the host towns or cities and ultimately become urban residents who have received permits for permanent residence in these places and gained equal access to public services for urban residents (Jin Zhongxia and Xiong Lu 2013). It is also believed by some that the They refer to rural people who have lost all the contracted land due to expropriation for urban construction. 1
1 Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers
citizenization of rural migrant workers refers to the process where, and the result that, rural people become truly integrated into urban life and are accepted by native urban residents after going through changes in location, occupation, lifestyle, behavior and hukou, making improvements in overall competence, and subscribing to civic values (Qiu Pengxu 2013). To sum up, we believe that the citizenization of rural migrant workers is the process where rural migrant workers, or former-farmers, turn into city resident registered city residents. Specifically, it refers to the process that, while going through migration and occupational changes, rural migrant workers become urban residents who have received permits for permanent residence in the host towns or cities and gained access to social welfare and political rights equal to those available to native urban residents. The citizenization of rural migrant workers means much more than people having their rural hukous changed to urban ones. It is in fact a process whereby after receiving urban hukou, rural migrant workers are treated in the same way as native urban residents in terms of political rights, jobs, social security, public services and others, while getting gradually integrated into the host cities in terms of values, social identity and lifestyle. As a result, the citizenization of rural migrant workers will be a very long process. It chief marks are: Change in Social Status Today, a large number of rural migrant workers are counted as part of the permanent urban population, but still have rural hukou. In short, their residency status as farmers remains unchanged. They still carry the stigma as “migrant workers” even though they are already settled in the host towns or cities. As a result, the citizenization of rural migrant workers requires the reform of the hukou system to be expedited so that rural migrant workers may soon rather than later obtain permanent residence in the host towns or cities, thereby becoming part of the urban residents in these places. Equality in Terms of Political Rights In China, the political rights of urban and rural residents have long been closely linked with their hukou. Today, few rural migrant workers in Chinese towns or cities are denied the rights to vote or run in elections, and to participate in community management. But they are faced with severe inequality in political rights when compared with native urban residents. The citizenization of rural migrant workers requires that rural migrant workers be granted the same rights to political participation as those of native urban residents, including the rights to vote or be voted for, to participate in the administration and discussion of state affairs, to form trade unions, and to participate in community management. Full Coverage by Public Services Today in China, public services and social security policies are essentially linked with hukou and prioritize urban areas over rural ones. Accordingly, rural migrant workers typically do not have equal access to public services and social security benefits. The citizenization of rural migrant workers aims to ensure that these migrants and native urban residents have equal access to public services and social security benefits relevant to employment, child education, medical care, social insurance, housing assistance and social assistance,
thereby promoting the full public-service coverage of the permanent urban population while protecting rural migrant workers from being discriminated against in terms of public services. Improvements in Financial and Living Conditions Given limitations in professional competence, education level and money, rural migrant workers tend to have low incomes and quality of life and are apparently behind native urban residents in terms of financial and living conditions. The citizenization of rural migrant workers requires a continuous increase in the incomes of rural migrant workers and assistance in improving their housing and living conditions. This will gradually reduce gaps between them and native urban residents and help them make the transformation from farmers into registered city residents in terms of lifestyle and patterns of consumption. Only by changing the lifestyle can rural migrant workers really get integrated into urban life. Improvements in Overall Cultural Competence Rural migrant workers are far from meeting requirements for modern registered city residents as they are under- educated and short of occupational training with lower overall capability. Such cultural capability affects occupational choices made by rural migrant workers, increases income inequalities, and weakens their sense of belonging to the host city. For this reason, some native urban residents will have prejudices against rural migrant workers. As a result, the citizenization of rural migrant workers requires helping rural migrant workers improve their overall competence including professional skills, education levels and so on. Extensive Acceptance Across the Host Society In order for rural migrant workers to turn into registered city residents and become really integrated into urban society, extensive acceptance is also required. On the one hand, rural migrant workers are supposed to have a sense of belonging to the city, achieve self-identity and view themselves as part of the urban residential population. On the other hand, social discrimination and prejudice against rural migrant workers should gradually disappear before these migrants are extensively accepted across the host society. Only after they achieve such self-identity and are accepted by others at the same time, can rural migrant workers integrate with native urban residents.
urrent Rural Migrant Workers in China: Citizenization C Status The urbanization of China is primarily characterized by a large number of rural migrant workers with a low citizenization rate. A thorough understanding of the number and characteristics of rural migrant workers as well as their citizenization status constitutes the basis and precondition for proposing a scientifically reasonable citizenization strategy and developing practicable citizenization policies/ measures.
1 Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers
Rapid and Steady Growth in Number Nowadays, the number of rural migrant workers is increasing rapidly and steadily in China. A review of rural-urban migration since China began the process of reform and opening up shows that the growth of the number of non-local migrant workers as part of the population of rural migrant workers is obviously characterized by five stages due to the effects of China’s macro-economy and macro-level policies (see Fig. 1.1): Stage 1 was a period of migration to the nearest location in the 1980s. Since the household responsibility system was implemented in rural areas shortly after China began the process of reform and opening up, a large part of the rural labor force shifted to TVEs, leading to a migration model in which farmers left farmland but still worked in their hometowns. It was during this stage that the number of non-local migrant workers increased to 30 million people in 1989 from about two million people in 1983, or an annual average growth of about five million people. Stage 2 was a period of interprovincial migration in the early 1990s. As a great many jobs were created in China’s coastal regions thanks to fast economic growth and rapid transition to a market economy after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, the number of rural migrant workers grew sharply to 70 million people in 1995, or an annual average growth of nearly seven million people. Stage 3 was a period of slow growth in the late 1990s. Some cities imposed restrictive measures on the recruitment of migrant workers under the pressure to create jobs for incoming farmers, new members of the urban labor force and the
Fig. 1.1 Five stages in the growth of the number of Chinese non-local rural migrant workers (Source: data of 1983, 1989 and 1993 is from the Research Team, the Research Office of the State Council (2006); data of 1996 and 2006 is from the first and second National Agricultural Census; data of the 2008–2011 period is from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) (2012); data of the remaining years is from surveys by the NBS)
u nemployed. As a result, the number of rural migrant workers increased at a lower rate in China. Among them, the number of non-local migrant workers increased to 78.49 million people in 2000 at an annual average rate of only about 1.7 million people. Stage 4 was a period of compensatory rebound in 2001 and 2002. Under the policy of “Remove unreasonable restrictions on the rural labor force’s entry into towns or cities for jobs, and guide its migration between urban and rural areas and between regions” specified in the 10th Five-Year Plan,2 a compensatory rebound occurred in the growth of the number of rural migrant workers in China. In 2001, the number of non-local migrant workers reached 83.99 million people; in 2002, it was 104.7 million people, an increase of more than 24 % or 20.71 million people year on year. Stage 5 is a period of fast and steady growth since 2003. With continuous policy incentives, the number of rural migrant workers has entered a period of steady growth. In 2012, the number of non-local migrant workers reached 163.36 million people, or an annual average growth of about six million people. Non-local migrant workers in Chinese towns and cities (their total number is estimated on a 95.6 % basis3) represent a nearly constant share, or about 21.5 % on average, of the urban population since 2003. In 2012, for example, that share was 21.9 %. The contribution of such migrant workers to the Urbanization rate increased to 11.5 percentage points in 2012 from 7.8 percentage points in 2002, or an annual average growth of 0.37 percentage points.
Numbers and Characteristics here Were About 240 Million Rural Migrant Workers in Towns T and Cities, or Around One Third of China’s Urban Population in 2012 There were about 240 million rural migrant workers in Chinese towns and cities, or around one third of China’s urban population (712 million people) in 2012. Specifically, there were about 156 million non-local migrant workers, or 21.9 % of Before the outline of the 10th Five-Year Plan was released, the then General Office of the Ministry of Labor (MOL) issued the Opinions on Creating Jobs for the Surplus Labor Force in early 2000. In June, the CPC Central Committee and the State Council co-issued the Opinions on Promoting the Healthy Growth of Small Towns and Cities. In July, Chinese ministries/commissions such as the MOL, together with the Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), co-issued the Notice on Furthering the Pilot Program of Creating Jobs for the Rural Labor Force. All these documents proposed that rural-urban migration be promoted and that unreasonable restrictions on farmers’ entry into cities for jobs be removed. In late 2001, the then State Planning Commission (SPC) required that seven charges relevant to migrant workers be cancelled by the end of February 2002. These policies and plans jointly led to the compensatory growth of the number of rural migrant workers in 2001 and 2002. 3 In 2009, 95.6 % of Chinese non-local migrant workers worked in towns or cities (the Department of Rural Surveys, the NBS 2010). 2
1 Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers Table 1.1 The number of rural migrant workers in China’s urban population (in million) Total population Urban population People with rural Hukou among urban population People with rural Hukou in cities People with rural Hukou in towns Floating population in urban population Floating population in cities Floating population in towns Non-local migrant workers in towns and cities
Source: the calculations are based on the Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China, the China Population & Employment Statistics Yearbook 2011, the Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2011, and the Statistical Bulletin of the People’s Republic of China on the 2008 National Economic and Social Development Note: the parenthesized percentages are the shares in the urban population. The number of non- local migrant workers in towns and cities was estimated on a 95.6 % basis
China’s urban population. They contributed 11.5 percentage points to China’s Urbanization rate. If we estimate the number of local migrant workers who work or live in towns or cities on a 40 % basis, then that number is about 40 million people. There are about 50 million farmers who have lost their land (Wei Houkai et al. 2011). The other people represent a small portion of the population. Since raw statistics about rural migrant workers are unavailable, we made an estimate using data relevant to people with rural hukou, the floating population and the number of non-local migrant workers in China’s urban population. The results are shown in Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.2. 1. People with rural hukou as part of the urban population refers to the entirety of permanent urban residents with rural hukou, including non-local migrant workers who permanently live in towns or cities and permanent urban residents with rural hukou such as farmers in formerly rural areas reclassified as cities but still basically under rural governances, a kind of quasi-city and sometimes called “villages inside cities”, farmers who have lost their land, some local migrant workers and farmers in city districts. In 2010, there were 310 million people with rural hukou, or 46.3 %, of China’s urban population. They contributed 21.5 percentage points to China’s urbanization rate. This number included 145 million people with rural hukou in cities and 165 million such people in towns. 2. The floating population in the urban population refers to urban residents who have left the places where their hukous are registered for at least half a year (excluding people who live in city districts and have left the places where their hukous are registered for at least half a year), including farmers living in quasi-cities, i.e., landless farmers, and local migrant workers. In 2010, the floating population in Chinese towns and cities reached 187 million people, or 27.9 % of China’s urban
Fig. 1.2 Make-up of China’s urban population, 2010 (Source: this figure is based on data in Table 1.1)
population, who contributed 13.9 percentage points to China’s Urbanization rate. It included 133 million people in cities and 54 million ones in towns. 3. Non-local migrant workers in the urban population. In 2012, there were 263 million migrant workers in China, including 163 million non-local ones. If 95.6 % of them worked in towns and cities, then there were about 156 million non-local migrant workers in these places, or 21.9 % of the urban population, who contributed 11.5 percentage points to the Urbanization rate. hose Whose Families Migrate with Them Always Represent T About 20 % of All Non-local Migrant Workers With regard to staying with their families or not, rural migrant workers mainly include those whose families migrate with them and those who migrate alone. NBS survey data shows that from 2008 to 2011, the ratio of migrant workers who migrated with their families to those who migrated alone was always around 1:4. In other words, migrant workers who migrated with their families represented about 20 % of all non-local migrant workers (see Fig. 1.3). We may therefore estimate that, of 163.36 million non-local workers in 2012, there were about 33 million of them who migrated with their families, and the remaining 130 million were those who migrated alone.
1 Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers
Fig. 1.3 Family migration characteristics of non-local rural migrant workers, 2008–2012. Note: the number of non-local migrant workers who migrated with their families in 2012 was estimated on a pro rata basis (Source: data of the 2008–2011 period is from the Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report 2011, and data of 2012 is from the Statistical Bulletin of the People’s Republic of China on the 2012 National Economic and Social Development)
nder-Educated Young Men Represent the Majority of Non-local U Migrant Workers The sex ratio of Chinese migrant workers is nearly unchanged since 2008, as men represent about two thirds of all such workers. In 2011, for example, men represented 65.9 % of all Chinese migrant workers (the NBS 2012). With regard to age, most non-local migrant workers are younger than 40 years of age. In 2011, for example, there were about 130 million non-local migrant workers younger than 40 years of age, or 81.8 % of all such workers. Among them, those born after 1980, or the new-generation migrant workers, represented over 60 % of all non-local migrant workers. With regard to educational background, those at the level of junior high school or lower represent about three quarters of all non-local migrant workers. In 2011, for example, those at the level of junior high school or lower represented 74.5 % of all non-local migrant workers, including 62.9 % at the level junior high school, 10.7 % at the level of elementary school, and 0.9 % at the level of illiteracy or near-illiteracy (the NBS 2012). astern Region Are the Leading Destination of Non-local E Migrant Workers, but with a Decreasing Percentage In China, the eastern region has long been the leading destination of non-local migrant workers, while central and west regions are the leading source of them. In 2009, 68.1 % of all 145 million non-local migrant workers across China were from
central and west regions; 62.5 % of them went to the eastern region (the Department of Rural Surveys, the NBS 2010). In other words, the majority of non-local migrant workers left central and western regions for eastern ones, especially the Pearl and Yangtze River deltas. Nonetheless, with their rapid economic growth in most recent years, central and western regions combine to have an increasing percentage in received non-local migrant workers, whereas eastern regions see a rapidly decreasing percentage. The number of migrant workers who move between provinces in particular has been decreasing, leading to a change in the situation where they represent the majority of all non-local migrant workers. In 2011, for example, there were 74.73 million migrant workers who moved between provinces, or 47.1 % of all non-local migrant workers in China (the NBS 2012), which was 6.2 percentage points lower than in 2008. The floating population in towns and cities can reflect the status of non-local migrant workers from another perspective. In 2010, the floating population in towns and cities in eastern regions was 107.91 million people, or 57.6 % of China’s floating population; it was 38.30 million people in central regions and 41.11 million people in western regions, or 20.4 % and 22.0 % of China’s total population respectively. Specifically, the provinces of Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Shandong took the lead and combined to represent 36.5 % of China’s floating population in towns and cities (see Fig. 1.4). Of the interprovincial floating population in 2011, 72.45 % was from the provinces of Anhui, Sichuan, Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Guizhou; 86.81 % went to Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu and Fujian (the Department of Floating Population Service and Management (DFPSM),
Fig. 1.4 Distribution of floating population in towns and cities by province, 2010 (Source: this figure is based on population sampling survey data from the Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China)
1 Overall Strategy for Promoting the Citizenization of Rural Migrant Workers
the National Population and Family Planning Commission of People’s Republic of China (NPFPC) 2012). ost Migrant Workers Are in Industries Such as Manufacturing, M Construction and Traditional Services Since they are under-educated and short of professional skills, non-local migrant workers tend to be in industries with low skill requirements, such as manufacturing, construction and traditional services. 2010 population census data shows that most, or 71.9 %, of the sampled 14.37 million non-local migrant workers, were in fields such as production, transport equipment operation, commerce and services. Specifically, those in the fields of production and transport equipment operation represented 40.6 %; those in the fields of commerce and services, 31.3 %; technicians, 11.0 %; those in the other four categories, 17.1 % (see Fig. 1.5). And according to an NBS survey (2012), most migrant workers have long worked in manufacturing, construction and traditional services, which received 36.0 %, 17.7 % and 34.2 % of all such workers respectively, or a combined 87.9 %, in 2011. As for traditional services, resident and other services represented 12.2 %; wholesale and retail, 10.1 %; hotel and restaurant, 5.3 %; transport, warehousing and postal service, 6.6 %.
Fig. 1.5 Distribution of non-local rural migrant workers by occupation (Source: this figure is based on population sampling survey data from the Tabulation on the 2010 Population Census of the People’s Republic of China)