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Behavioral law and economics


Behavioral Law and Economics



Behavioral Law
and Economics
Eyal Zamir
Doron Teichman

1
Behavioral Law and Economics. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman.
© Oxford University Press 2018. Published 2018 by Oxford University Press.


1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data
Names: Zamir, Eyal, author. | Teichman, Doron, author.
Title: Behavioral law and economics / Eyal Zamir, Doron Teichman.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017057744 | ISBN 9780190901349 ((hardback) : alk. paper) |
  ISBN 9780190901356 ((pbk.) : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Law and economics—Psychological aspects. | Economics—Psychological aspects. |
  Human behavior models—Economic aspects.
Classification: LCC K487.E3 Z359 2018 | DDC 340/.19—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017057744
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To my parents, Yona and Meir Teichman
D.T.
To Daphna, Abigail, and Yaara
E.Z.





Contents

Preface 

Introduction 

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Part One    Economic and Psychological Background

1. Economic Analysis of Law: An Overview 
A. Introduction 
B. Positive Economics 
C. Normative Economics 
D. Conclusion 

2. Behavioral Studies 
A. An Overview 
1. History, Methodology, and Interdisciplinary Impact 
2. Dual-​Process Theories 
3. Theories of Heuristics and Biases 
4. Cognitive Biases versus Fast-​and-​Frugal Heuristics 
5. Typology of Phenomena and Structure of the Chapter
B. Probability Assessments and Related Issues 
1. Conjunction and Disjunction Fallacies 
2. Base-​Rate Neglect 
3. Inverse Fallacy 
4. Insensitivity to Sample Size and Related Phenomena 
5. Certainty Effect 
6. Availability 
7. Subadditivity 

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8. Hindsight Bias 
9. Ambiguity Aversion
C. Prospect Theory and Related Issues 
1. General 
2. Loss Aversion and Emotions 
3. Reference-​Dependence 
4. Framing Effects 
5. Status Quo and Omission Biases 
6. Endowment Effect
(a) Significance and Scope
(b) Causes and Explanations 
7. Sunk Costs and Escalation of Commitment
D. Egocentrism and Motivated Reasoning 
1. General 
2. Motivated Reasoning and Confirmation Bias 
3. Overoptimism and the Better-​than-​Average Effect 
4. Overconfidence 
5. Naïve Realism and False-​Consensus Effect 
6. Fundamental Attribution Error 
7. Planning Fallacy 
8. Illusion of Control 
9. Behavioral Ethics
E. Reference-​Dependence and Order Effects 
1. General 
2. Contrast and Assimilation Effects 
3. Anchoring and Adjustment 
4. Order Effects: Primacy and Recency 
5. Compromise and Attraction Effects 
6. Diminishing Sensitivity
F. Procrastination, Myopia, and Bounded Willpower 
1. Procrastination 
2. Myopia and Bounded Willpower
G. Moral Judgment and Human Motivation 
1. General 
2. Deontology versus Consequentialism
(a) Normative Ethics
(b) Behavioral Studies 
3. Fairness and Social Justice
(a) General
(b) Substantive Fairness
(c) Procedural Fairness
(d) Belief in a Just World 

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4. Prosocial Behavior and Altruism
(a) Helping Others
(b) Cooperation
H. Cross-​Phenomenal Factors 
1. Individual Differences 
2. Expertise 
3. Deciding for Others 
4. Group Decision-​Making and Advice-​Taking 
5. Cultural Differences 
6. Debiasing
(a) Preliminary Comments
(b) Technological Strategies
(c) Motivational Strategies: Incentives and Accountability
(d) Cognitive Strategies
I. Concluding Remarks 

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Part T wo    Behavioral Law and Economics: A Synopsis

3. An Overview of Behavioral Law and Economics 
A. Introduction 
B. History 
C. Methodology 
D. Challenges 
E. Conclusion 

4. Normative Implications 
A. Introduction 
B. Behavioral Findings and Normative Theories 
C. Prevailing Moral Judgments and the Law 
D. Behaviorally Informed Lawmaking 
1. General 
2. Ends
(a) Introduction
(b) Preventing Exploitation
(c) Legal Paternalism 
3. Means
(a) Introduction
(b) Disclosure Duties
(c) Nudges and Shoves
E. Conclusion 

5. Behavioral Insights and Basic Features of the Law 
A. Introduction 

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B. Law, Reference-​Dependence, and Loss Aversion 
1. Private Law: Tort versus Unjust Enrichment 
2. Human Rights: Civil and Political versus Social and Economic 
3. Additional Examples
C. Evolutionary Theories 
D. Cognitive Psychology, Commonsense Morality, and the Law 
E. A Normative Perspective 
F. Conclusion 

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Part Three    Private and Commercial Law

6. Property Law 
A. Introduction 
B. Ownership and Possession 
1. Psychological Ownership 
2. Determining Ownership 
3. Framing Ownership 
4. Ownership, Possession, and the Endowment Effect
C. Constitutional Property Law 
1. Takings versus Givings 
2. Physical versus Nonphysical Taking 
3. Scope and Mode of Compensation 
4. Homes versus Other Property
D. Intellectual Property 
1. General 
2. The Innovation Lottery 
3. Endowment and Creativity Effects 
4. Sequential Innovations 
5. Hindsight Bias
E. Protecting Property Rights: Property Rules versus Liability Rules 
F. Conclusion 

7. Contract Law 
A. Introduction 
B. Trust, Promise, and Contract 
1. General 
2. Standard-​Form Contracts
C. Pre-​contractual Negotiations 
1. General 
2. The Role of Default Rules and Other Reference Points
D. Contract Formation 
E. Interpretation and Supplementation 
F. Performance 

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G. Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract 
1. Analytical and Doctrinal Background 
2. The Four Interests as Reference Points 
3. Expectation Damages versus Specific Performance 
4. Disgorgement 
5. Intentions and Motivations
H. Agreed Remedies: Liquidated Damages 
1. A Puzzling Doctrine 
2. Behavioral Insights 
3. Liquidated Damages and the Decision to Breach
I. Conclusion 

8. Consumer Contracts 
A. Introduction 
B. Marketing Techniques 
1. General 
2. Information Presentation 
3. Limited Availability 
4. Low-​Ball and Bait-​and-​Switch Techniques 
5. Lenient Return Policies
C. Pricing 
1. General 
2. Price Framing 
3. Multidimensional and Complex Pricing 
4. Deferred and Contingent Payments 
5. Odd Pricing
D. Non-​salient Contract Clauses 
E. Post-​contracting Behavior 
F. Market Solutions 
1. General 
2. Competition 
3. Reputation 
4. Conclusion
G. Legal Solutions 
1. General 
2. Disclosure 
3. Mandatory Regulation
H. Conclusion 

9. Tort Law 
A. Introduction 
B. Economic Analysis of Tort Law: An Overview 

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C. Behavioral Analysis: Liability Regimes 
1. Boundedly Rational Agents 
2. Boundedly Rational Adjudicators
(a) Negligence versus Strict Liability and the Hindsight Bias
(b) Contributory Negligence versus Comparative Negligence
and Anchoring
D. Behavioral Analysis: Damages 
1. Framing the Question 
2. Hedonic Damages
E. Product Liability 
1. Defective Design 
2. Warnings
F. Conclusion 

10. Commercial Law: Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Antitrust 
A. Introduction 
B. Firms, Markets, and Rational Choice 
1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
2. Behavioral Corporate Finance
C. Corporate Law 
1. General 
2. Hindsight Bias and the Business Judgment Rule 
3. Behavioral Corporate Governance
(a) Overconfident CEOs
(b) Passive Boards
(c) Legal Responses
D. Securities Regulation 
1. General 
2. Securities Fraud 
3. Retail Investors
E. Antitrust Law 
1. General 
2. Boundedly Rational Consumers 
3. Boundedly Rational Firms 
4. Concluding Remarks and Reply to Critics
F. Conclusion 

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Part Four   Public Law

11. Administrative, Constitutional, and International Law 
A. Introduction 
B. Institutions 
1. Public Choice Theory and Cognitive Psychology
(a) General
(b) Designing Governmental Institutions 

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2. Rule-​Making
(a) Judicial versus Legislative Rule-​Making
(b) Temporary Legislation 
3. Concluding Remarks
C. Citizens 
1. General 
2. Citizens’ Judgments and Choices 
3. Governmental Manipulation of Citizens’ Heuristics and Biases
D. Human Rights 
1. Freedom of Speech
(a) Theoretical and Doctrinal Background
(b) Behavioral Analysis 
2. The Fight against Terrorism 
3. Affirmative Action 
4. Concluding Remarks
E. International Law 
1. Challenges 
2. Prospects
F. Conclusion 

12. Criminal Law and Enforcement 
A. Introduction 
B. Efficient Crime Control 
C. Do People Want Efficient Crime Control Policies? 
1. Punishment and the Probability of Detection 
2. Punishment and the Risk of Future Offending 
3. Punishment Judgments and Policy Design 
4. Case in Point: The Law of Criminal Attempts
D. Deterrence Theory and Behavioral Analysis 
1. Attitudes toward Risk 
2. Perceptions of the Risk of Punishment
(a) Overoptimism
(b) Availability
(c) Prediction and Postdiction
(d) Probability Estimates and Repeat Behavior 
3. Perceptions of Sanctions
(a) The Hedonic Dimensions of Punishment
(b) Formal Sanctions and Internal Motivations
E. Behavioral Ethics—​Predicting When Crime Is More Likely 
1. Factual Ambiguity 
2. Legal Ambiguity 
3. Driving Forces
F. Punishing Recidivists 
G. Conclusion 

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13. Tax Law and Redistribution 
A. Introduction 
B. Tax Design 
1. General 
2. Budget Balance 
3. The Political Salience of Taxes 
4. Tax Exemptions versus Spending
C. Taxpayers’ Behavior 
1. Economic Decision-​Making 
2. Tax Compliance 
3. Challenging Taxes 
4. The Normative Debate
D. Behavioral Insights and Redistribution 
1. General 
2. Judgments of Progressivity 
3. Scarcity 
4. Wealth and Subjective Well-​Being 
5. Methods and Objects of Redistribution
E. Modifying Behavior through Taxes 
F. Conclusion 

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Part Five    The Legal Process

14. Litigants’ Behavior 
A. Introduction 
B. Standard Economic Analysis of Litigation and Settlement 
C. Behavioral Impediments to Settlement 
1. General 
2. Information, Self-​Serving Bias, and Overoptimism 
3. “Irrational” Motives 
4. Biases Stemming from the Adversarial Nature of Litigation 
5. Reference-​Dependence in Assessing Settlement Offers 
6. Framing Litigation Outcomes and Risk Attitude 
7. Conclusion
D. Behavioral Factors Encouraging Settlement: Anticipated Regret
and Loss Aversion 
E. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
F. Attorneys and Clients 
1. General 
2. Fee Arrangements 
3. Lawyers’ Decision-​Making 
4. Lawyers’ Motivation
G. A Note on Plea Bargains 
H. Conclusion 

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15. Judicial Decision-​Making 
A. Introduction 
B. The Story Model and Coherence-​Based Reasoning 
C. Judicial Decision-​Makers’ Heuristics and Biases 
1. Context Dependence 
2. Hindsight Bias 
3. Omission Bias and Related Phenomena 
4. Converting Qualitative into Quantitative Judgments and the
Anchoring Effect 
5. Conclusion
D. Inadmissible Evidence and Other Irrelevant Information 
1. The Challenge 
2. Jury Instructions and Other Remedies
E. Priming and Prejudice 
F. Judicial Decision-​Making: Moral Judgments 
G. Rules versus Standards: Certainty and Predictability 
H. Group Decision-​Making 
I. Judges versus Laypersons 
J. A General Assessment of Behavioral Research of Judicial
Decision-​Making 

16. Evidence Law 
A. Introduction 
B. Types of Evidence and Cognitive Biases 
1. Eyewitnesses
(a) Eyewitness Testimony
(b) Fact-​Finders’ Assessment of Eyewitness Testimonies
(c) Policy Implications 
2. Probabilistic Evidence
(a) The Wells Effect
(b) Base-​Rate Neglect
(c) Inverse Fallacy 
3. Circumstantial Evidence: The Anti-​inference Bias 
4. Expert Testimonies 
5. Conclusion
C. Burden of Proof 
1. Normative and Doctrinal Background 
2. Burden of Proof and the Story Model 
3. Burden of Proof: A Tiebreaker or a Reference Point? 
4. Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the Burden of Proof
in Civil Litigation
(a) Who Should Bear the Burden?
(b) What Is the Actual Standard of Proof? 

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5. Protected Values, Taboo Trade-​Offs, and the Burden of Proof
in Criminal Litigation
D. The Upside of Bounded Rationality 
E. Conclusion 
Index 

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Preface

Notwithstanding the great impact behavioral law and economics has had on legal theory
and policymaking in the past two decades, to date no comprehensive textbook or treatise has been written on the subject. This is the first textbook-​treatise aimed at providing
readers with a general overview of the field—​including its economic and behavioral background, methodology, normative and policy implications, and applications in various
legal fields.
Our collaboration in this sphere began when, a few years ago, we were asked to co-​edit
The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law (2014)—​the first handbook in
this area, whose chapters were written by some of the leading figures in the field. While we
were very proud of the Handbook, we felt that there was still a need for a unified treatment
of the field, for novices and experts alike. We hope that this book will introduce the fascinating world of behavioral legal studies to broader audiences, and trigger further research
by jurists, psychologists, economists, and others.
Each draft chapter of the book was initially written by one of us (with some sections
occasionally written by the other co-​author), but the outcome is a product of a truly collaborative effort and joint deliberation.*
Some parts of the book draw on our previous publications, including the chapters
on “Loss Aversion,” “The Hindsight Bias,” and “Judicial Decision-​Making,” included in the
above-​mentioned handbook.
We are very grateful to many colleagues with whom we had fruitful exchanges
throughout the years—​in particular, to Ilana Ritov and Yuval Feldman, our long-​time research partners. Special thanks are also due to Ilan Benshalom, Barak Medina, and Anne-​Lise

*  The initial versions of Chapters 1–​6, 8, 11, 13, 14, part of 15, and 16 were mostly written by Eyal Zamir. The
initial versions of Chapters 7, 9, 10, 12, and part of 15 were mostly written by Doron Teichman.


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P reface

Sibony, who insightfully commented on chapters of the book, and to Shmuel Baron, Inbal
Elbaz, Yuval Farkash, Elisha Harlev, Carl Nathan Johnson, Ben Levko, Tal Mendelson, Tal
Nisim, Elad Spiegelman, and Roi Yair, who provided excellent research assistance. Generous
financial support was received from the I-​CORE Program of the Planning and Budgeting
Committee and the Israel Science Foundation (Grant No. 1821/​12).


Introduction

For several decades, one of the leading perspectives in legal theory—​perhaps the leading
perspective—​has been the economic analysis of law. The theory of human behavior underlying standard economic analysis of law—​like economic analysis in general—​has
been the rational choice theory. According to this theory, people always strive to enhance their own well-​being, by choosing the available option that maximizes their expected utility. In the past few decades, hand in hand with comparable developments in
economics, economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies that attest to prevalent and systematic deviations from the
assumptions of economic rationality. These studies contested the assumption of thin,
cognitive rationality by showing that people’s preferences often do not comply with the
formal requirements of dominance, transitivity, invariance, etc. These studies also called
into question the assumption of thick, motivational rationality, by highlighting the role
of motivations such as fairness, envy, and altruism in people’s behavior. From a slightly
different angle, experimental and empirical studies have shown that most people’s moral
judgments do not fall in line with the consequentialist underpinnings of welfare economics—​the normative branch of economic analysis—​but are much more aligned with
deontological morality.
While these insights were initially perceived as antithetical to standard economic and
legal-​economic analysis, over time they have been largely integrated into mainstream economic analysis, including economic analysis of law. Moreover, the impact of behavioral
insights has long since transcended purely economic analysis of law:  in recent years, the
behavioral movement has become one of the most influential developments in legal scholarship in general. Much as economic reasoning became a standard form of legal analysis in
the 1980s and 1990s (at least in some parts of the world), behavioral analysis has become
a standard form of interdisciplinary analysis. It is also gradually influencing legislative,
administrative, and judicial policymaking throughout the world.
Behavioral Law and Economics. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman.
© Oxford University Press 2018. Published 2018 by Oxford University Press.


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In troducti on

In recent years, the growing impact of behavioral law and economics has been
accompanied by the emergence of empirical and experimental legal studies. This new
paradigm has transformed the nature and scope of the research conducted by behavioral-​legal scholars. Rather than just draw on the results of empirical studies conducted
by non-​jurists, a growing number of researchers have engaged in experimental and empirical studies of their own, designed specifically to answer distinctively legal questions.
Thanks to these developments, the integration of economics, psychology, and law
is breaking exciting new ground in legal theory, social sciences, and governmental
policymaking.
Consuming behavioral-​economic scholarship—​let  alone producing it—​requires familiarity with three different disciplines. Unfortunately, there are practically no textbooks
on behavioral economics, and very few on judgment and decision-​making—​the primary
body of psychological studies informing behavioral legal analysis. While this state of affairs
has heightened the need for a textbook-​treatise on behavioral law and economics, it has also
made our task particularly challenging.
The book comprises sixteen chapters, organized in five parts. Part I lays the groundwork for the ensuing discussion:  Chapter  1 introduces the basic tenets of positive and
normative economics; Chapter  2 then reviews the psychological findings that form the
basis of behavioral law and economics. While focusing on studies of judgment and decision-​making, Chapter 2 also draws on research in social and moral psychology, experimental game theory, and experimental philosophy. It describes in some detail numerous
documented heuristics and biases, as well as issues that cut across the various phenomena—​
such as the effect of expertise on decision-​making, group decision-​making, individual and
cultural differences, and debiasing.
Part II consists of three chapters that provide an overview of behavioral law and economics, and discuss some general themes. These include an overview of the field, its history,
methodology, and the challenges it faces (Chapter 3); a general discussion of the normative
and policy implications of behavioral insights (Chapter 4); and an analysis of the intriguing
correspondence between cognitive psychology, morality, and law (Chapter 5).
The remaining three parts provide a critical survey of existing contributions of
behavioral studies to various legal fields. Starting with private and commercial law, Part
III offers five chapters (6–​10) on property law (including intellectual property, and the
property rules versus liability rules debate), contract law, consumer contracts, tort law, and
commercial law (including corporate, securities, and antitrust law), respectively. Part IV
is devoted to public law—​starting with a discussion of administrative, constitutional, and
international law (Chapter 11), through criminal law and enforcement (Chapter 12), and
concluding with tax law (Chapter 13). Finally, Part V discusses the legal process—​namely,
litigants’ behavior, judicial decision-​making, and the law of evidence (Chapters 14, 15, and
16, respectively).
While offering a broad overview of behavioral law and economics, this book does
not exhaust all contributions of behavioral insights to legal scholarship. In particular, we


In troducti on

felt that in some areas, existing behavioral scholarship—​as important and influential as it
might be—​does not yet lend itself to systematic synthesis (although it may well do so in the
future). Thus, for example, the book does not include chapters on labor and employment
law1 or on family law2 (although, some of the topics that would have been discussed under
these headings are discussed elsewhere in the book).

1.  With few exceptions, the behavioral analysis of labor and employment law focuses on two issues:  insufficient saving for old age, and employment discrimination. See Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension
Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275 (1991); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995); Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common
Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev 1783 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 Va. L. Rev. 205
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L.  Rev. 106 (2002); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger &
Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94
Calif. L. Rev. 997 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 969 (2006);
Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Employment Law, in The Behavioral Foundations of Public
Policy 264 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
2.  Examples of the relatively scarce behavioral research in family law include: Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow
of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think about Marriage, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 145,
193–​200 (1998); Daphna Lewinsohn-​Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution through Private Law, 91 Minn. L. Rev.
326, 385–​89 (2006); Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 827; Tess Wilkinson-​Ryan
& Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce:  Gender and the Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 Law &
Ineq. 109 (2008); Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-​Optimism in Marriage,
Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 733 (2009).

3



PA R T   O N E

Economic and Psychological
Background



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