Bạn đang xem bản rút gọn của tài liệu. Xem và tải ngay bản đầy đủ của tài liệu tại đây (39.63 MB, 1,014 trang )
omy is kept as a stabilization tool. In a monetary union, where states have
also relinquished monetary policy to the ECB, the pain of hard ﬁscal rules
is likely to be intolerable.
Once countries joined the euro, the main “carrot” enticing them to follow the
SGP’s budget rules (or to pretend to follow them) disappeared. Hence, surveillance, punishment, and commitment all quite predictably weakened once the
euro was up and running.
These failures of the SGP came to light only gradually, but by 2003 the pact was
in ruins, once it became clear that France and (ironically) Germany would be in
breach of the pact and that no serious action would be taken against them. As we
see next, ﬁscal problems in the Eurozone have only gotten worse, although whether
the principles of the SGP can, or should, be reinstated is the subject of ongoing
A MODERN BOOK FOR
A MODERN AUDIENCE
Feenstra and Taylor’s text incorporates
fresh perspectives, current topics, and
4 The Eurozone in Crisis, 2008–2013
up-to-date empirical research. It expands
For almost 10 years, Eurozone policy making focused on two main macroeconomicthe study of international economics to
goals: the ECB’s monetary policy credibility and inﬂation target, seen as a broad
success given low and stable inﬂation outcomes; and the Eurozone governments’encompass the latest theories and world
ﬁscal responsibility, seen as a failure given the general disregard for the SGP rules.events.
However, policy makers (like their counterparts all over the world) failed to spot key